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Impact Investing in South Africa: Investing in 
Empowerment, Empowering Investors 
Antoine Ducastel & Ward Anseeuw ∗ 
Abstract: »Impact Investing in Südafrika: In Ermächtigung investieren und Inves-
toren ermächtigen«. This paper examines how Impact Investment (II) becomes 
part and transforms structured accumulation regimes and circuits, with a par-
ticular emphasis on South Africa's agricultural sector. Through the joint imple-
mentation of a macro study of the South African II circuits, and a micro study 
of a particular II fund’s practices and impacts, the paper develops an in-depth 
political economy assessment of II circuits in order to historicize these circuits, 
to map the South African II community, and to characterize the power balanc-
es presently structuring it. Rather than highlighting ruptures, it draws the at-
tention to the historical continuities and path-dependencies as II related tools 
are rooted into older financial practices, shaping today's II development and 
practice - hence questioning II as a tool for empowerment. 
Keywords: Impact Investment, investment funds, Agriculture, Empowerment, 
political economy, South Africa. 
1. Introduction 
The fact is that there are at least ten million people out there  
who could drop dead tomorrow without having an impact  
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. (Ferguson 2015, 11)  
Quoting a South African sociologist, James Ferguson illustrates the radical 
disconnection between financial market on one hand, and large groups of South 
Africans kept aside from the financial circuits of accumulation. However, in 
October 2018, a South African National Task Force for Impact Investing (II) 
has been set up gathering major JSE actors: i.e., private banks (ABSA), asset 
management companies (Investec), insurance companies (Old Mutual) as well 
as government agencies (e.g., the Financial Service Board or the National 
Treasury), and several recognized impact investors, experts, and academics. 
This hub aims officially to “achieve socio-economic justice in South Africa by 
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building an inclusive and sustainable economy.”1 This raises a genuine ques-
tion: is the South African financial industry engaged in a “social U-turn”?  
Beyond South Africa, II experts and organizations are developing all over, 
as is well illustrated by the Global Impact Investment Network (GIIN) estab-
lished after the 2007/2008 financial crisis. According to its promoters, three 
characteristics define and differentiate II from other financial practices and 
circuits: (1) intentionality to address a social or an environmental challenge; (2) 
investment with return expectations; (3) impact measurement (UNDP 2015).  
Rather than looking for objective practices, tools, or moral beliefs, we con-
sider II as an ongoing process, i.e., financial circuits in the making (Ducastel 
and Anseeuw 2018), continuously defined and re-defined by actors’ coopera-
tion and competition. As stated by Théo Bourgeron (2020, 119), in this special 
issue), “impact investors are engaged in the construction of the impact invest-
ing sector as they build the norms and devices that constitute its financial chan-
nels.” Beyond this material infrastructure, a broad range of practitioners, ex-
perts, and regulators, at both global and national levels, engage into an II’s 
definition and legitimation work constantly (re)framing the borders of this 
emerging asset class.  
Since its emergence in 2007, extensive literature has been produced about II. 
Firstly, by II practitioners highlighting its transformation potential in both 
developed and developing countries.2 Later on, by social scientists, who largely 
criticize and perceive II as a “financialization” of the welfare state (Golka 
2019), disseminating financial logics, actors, valuation instruments, and con-
ceptions in non-financial spheres (Chiapello 2015). Moreover, academics notic-
ing the fragmented dimension of the II field established several typologies 
according to the financiers’ political and moral beliefs and/or professional 
practices and devices (Barman 2016; Chiapello and Godefroy 2017). 
Existing II’s typologies tend to de-contextualize II circuits often neglecting 
the weight and influence of social, economic, and political structures over 
actor’s practices and socio-technical devices. However, II practitioners and 
promoters are embedded into broader growth or accumulation regimes charac-
terized by particular institutional compromises (Boyer 2000). Such a de-
contextualization is even reinforced by the Northern countries’ bias in the II 
literature. Indeed, existing studies tend to focus on developed countries, such as 
France (Chiapello and Godefroy 2016) or the UK (Golka 2019), with few – if 
any – assessing the implementation of II in developing countries.  
To fill these gaps, our paper will examine how II becomes part and trans-
forms structured accumulation regime and circuits in South Africa. To answer 
 
1  South African National Task Force for Impact Investing website <http://impactinvesting 
southafrica.co.za/> (Accessed on 16 July 2019) 
2  See for instance the annual “Impact Investors survey” published by JP Morgan in partner-
ship with the GIIN. 
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this question, we will implement in parallel a macro study of the South African 
II circuits, and a micro study of a particular II fund’s practices and impacts. By 
doing so, we were able to develop an in-depth political economy assessment of 
II circuits in order to historicize these circuits, to map the South African II 
community, and to characterize the power balances presently structuring it. 
Rather than highlighting ruptures, we will draw the attention to the historical 
continuities and path-dependencies as II related tools are rooted into older 
financial practices, shaping today’s II development and practice. In addition, 
we will open the black box of II concrete practices beyond official targets and 
purpose statements.  
Indeed, so far, the above mentioned literature remains largely focused on 
narratives (Golka 2019) or investment decision making (Bourgeron 2020), 
without assessing the instrument’s concrete and local uses. The risk of such 
assessments is to underestimate the actors’ interactions and to take for granted 
II promoters’ narratives. On the contrary, assessing II at ground level exposes 
instruments’ hijacking and unintended effects. For instance, our case study 
shows how II metrics and tools participate to a “depoliticization” of rural de-
velopment in South Africa while reinforcing financiers’ control over farm 
workers. As such, focusing on who these impact investors in South Africa are 
and what they effectively do with the II related tools, we aim at clarifying the 
articulation between II circuits and the broader South African accumulation 
regime.  
South Africa is an interesting case study of a developing country with a dual 
economy: on one hand, it includes a better-off, middle-income economy mostly 
developed around a “mineral-energy complex,” i.e., a macroeconomic accumu-
lation regime relying mostly on its mining industry – gold, coal, platinum (Fine 
and Rustomjee 1997). In addition, the country has a long-standing and power-
ful financial industry, which generates an increasing part of the domestic reve-
nue: 21% of the GDP in 2013 (Ashman, Fine, and Newman 2011). On the 
other hand, the post-apartheid society is profoundly unequal with previously 
disadvantaged racial groups still largely affected by poverty, unemployment or 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic and mostly confined into rural former homelands or 
urban townships without access to welfare and basic services (Jacobs and Hart 
2014). These embedded dualities have been shaped by public policies during 
the apartheid regime in order to secure and foster the accumulation regime 
(O’Meara 1996). Despite the 1994’s change of era, ending more than 50 years 
of apartheid, the hegemony of the dominant accumulation circuits continued 
and even expanded while a new “redistributive policy” has been implemented 
(Ferguson 2015).Therefore, it is worth analyzing the emergence of II in such a 
polarized political economy: does II effectively transform the dominant accu-
mulation circuits? 
The data presented in this chapter have been collected mainly through par-
ticipative observations, during a visiting position of four weeks at Green Firm 
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in June 2014, during which a study was to be realized on methodologies for 
social and environmental impacts’ financial valuation (a tool Green Firm wants 
to develop). This immersion, which included office work and visits to Green 
Firm’s farm in the Northern Cape Province, was an opportunity to observe and 
analyze the concrete practices and rationalities associated with asset manage-
ment, and, more precisely their financial work, decision-making processes, 
daily practices, and farm management in practice.  
2. A Long-Term Perspective on II in South Africa 
2.1  Impact Investment in South Africa from “Volkskapitalism” to 
Black Economic Empowerment 
The Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN)3 initiated its South African expe-
rience in the 2000’s, when the II movement also took off at global scale. In its 
report “The landscape for II in Southern Africa” published in 2016,4 the GIIN 
tracks II from 2005 onwards: 7358 deals accounting for about 30 billion dol-
lars, highlighting a steady growth in the region. In the 2000’s, the impact rheto-
ric was indeed adopted by South African investors, as promoted by develop-
ment banks and business schools such as the Bertha Centre for Social 
Innovation and Entrepreneurship at the University of Cape Town which is to 
date still the administrator of the National task force for II. At the same time, 
the first South African II asset managers and service providers joined the II 
global networks.5 
However, these investment practices can be traced back to the development 
of the country’s racialized regime of accumulation in the early 20th century. 
Since the late 21st century, the South African political economy is structured 
around the “mineral-energy complex,” historically supported and dominated by 
British imperial conglomerates. From the 1930’s, marginalized Afrikaner elites 
promoted a nationalist project with the objective to develop a “volkskapital-
ism” (O’Meara 2009), i.e., a capitalism by and for Afrikaners. From then on-
wards, the support to small and medium Afrikaner enterprises and the empow-
 
3  A pioneer initiative launched by the US Rockefeller Foundation in 2007 to promote II glob-
ally. Today, the GIIN gathers about 300 members – asset owners, asset managers, and ser-
vice providers; a sister association organizes II training sessions, promotes its own II rating 
system, and produces abundant grey literature on this “new asset class” – e.g., its annual 
“Spotlight in the market. The impact investor survey.” 
4  This report prepared by a network of financial actors engaged in the promotion of a “new 
asset class” must be taken for what it is worth. With this precaution in mind, however, it 
gives us an overview of the state of the II industry in South and Southern Africa. 
5  Ashburton Investments and Phatisa joined the GIIN. 
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erment of an Afrikaner bourgeoisie became strategic for this “Afrikaner na-
tion’s promoters.” As such in 1940, Sanlam, an Afrikaner insurance company, 
created a financial holding, the “Federaal Volks’ Investment,” to collect sav-
ings from Afrikaner farmers and employees in order to “afrikanize” parts of the 
economy and to develop small and medium enterprises owned and developed 
by the Afrikaner fraction of the population. At the same time, the South Afri-
can government implemented Development Financial Institutions (DFI), such 
as the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) in 1939. This public institu-
tion aimed at developing industrial capacities in South Africa, and after the 
victory of the National Party in 1949 to empower Afrikaans entrepreneurs 
(Clark 1994).6 
After the end of apartheid in 1994, industrial and financial conglomerates – 
henceforth controlled by a coalition of Afrikaners and English speaking elites – 
maintained and deepened their domination of the national economy in the 
framework of a liberalized and deregulated economy (Bond 2000). The control 
of these conglomerates, often seen as “capitalistic dominions” or even “white 
economic dominions,” is presently criticized, including for their past support to 
the apartheid regimes and the benefits harvested from (land, labor and econom-
ic) discriminatory policies (Marais 2011). In order to avoid direct public inter-
ventions and sanctions, these conglomerates, starting with the mining company 
Anglo-American and the insurance company Sanlam, implemented the first 
two Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) transactions in the early nineties. In 
the framework of these BEE investments, the company lends money to a BEE 
trust – grouping previously disadvantaged populations7 – in order to buy a 
significant, but minority, share of the company. The loan is reimbursed thanks 
to dividends paid out to the trust. After these pioneering initiatives, several 
BEE initiatives were set up in order to empower black South Africans and give 
them access to companies’ shareholding and boards.  
However, most of these first generation BEE investments collapsed8 or pro-
duced benefits for only a small group of black, often African National Con-
gress (ANC) connected, entrepreneurs (Freund 2007). Therefore, in 2003, a 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act9 was adopted. This law for-
malized a BEE scorecard, valuating companies' engagement with previously 
disadvantaged population groups. A high BEE score should open doors and 
 
6  Indeed, in the 1950s, eight of the nine IDC’s directors were Afrikaans-speaking. 
7  I.e., black, colored, and Indian population groups. In the rest of the paper, and as embedded 
in the “Black of BEE,” we will refer to these previously disadvantaged people as “blacks.” 
8  The first two transactions collapsed: a trust ended up bankrupted because of financial 
wrongdoing and the other one has been bought back by white shareholders (Freund 2007).  
9  Department of Trade and Industry, “Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 
(53/2003) Issue of Codes of Good Practice,” Government Gazette Staatskoerant (Republic of 
South Africa) 580, no. 36928 (October 11, 2013): 3–122, <https://www.thedti.gov.za/news 
2013/code_gud_practice10102013.pdf>. 
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lead to opportunities, through access to public markets and tenders for instance. 
The scorecard sets up, among other aspects, compliance targets in the frame-
work of South Africa’s corporate social investment policy: 1% of after-tax net 
profit should be invested on socio-economic development; 1% of after-tax net 
profit on supplier development; 1% of after-tax net profit on enterprise devel-
opment. Subsequently, corporate social investments skyrocketed: in 2014, 
South Africa’s larger corporations spent $4.3 billion as part of BEE policies 
(Theobald et al. 2015). Alongside public investments from development banks, 
corporate BEE investments fed the II boom in South Africa, making the coun-
try the largest market for impact capital in Africa (GIIN 2016). 
As described here above, “racial empowerment investments” for the integra-
tion and the promotion of different racial and ethnic groups into economic 
spheres existed in South Africa since the beginning of the 20th century. In the 
next section, we will map and analyze major actors involved in these empow-
erment investments highlighting once again historical continuities. 
2.2  Impact Investors and Managers in South Africa 
In its report, the GIIN distinguishes two groups of impact investors: develop-
ment finance institutions (DFIs) and non-DFIS representing a heterogeneous 
group of institutional investors. 
First, DFIs, both domestic and foreign, are by far the major impact inves-
tors’ group: between 2006 and 2015, they disbursed $24.2 billion representing 
83% of the national impact capital market (GIIN 2016). DFIs are government-
backed institutions that invest in the private sector, looking for both profitabil-
ity on one hand, and public interest on the other hand (Ducastel 2019). For 
instance in South Africa, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) was 
created in 1940 to boost long-term investment capital for domestic industries in 
order to alleviate the importation of manufactured goods. In October 1996, the 
new democratic government for the first time publicly endorsed the IDC as the 
“engine to drive BEE.” Consequently, IDC has invested R69 billion since 1996 
for black economic empowerment.10 Today, IDC provides financing for “high-
impact and labor-intensive” projects across the whole of Africa.11 
Together with South African institutions, international (e.g., International 
Finance Corporation, African Development Bank) and European (the French 
Proparco and the Dutch FMO for example) invested nearly $10 billion in South 
Africa during the same period. 
 
10  This was done through the pursuit of development outcomes targeting youth, women and 
black industrialists, B-BBEE, regional equity, localisation, community empowerment, and 
environmentally sustainable growth. IDC Corporate strategic plan 2016-2021, presented to 
Parliament Portfolio Committee on Economic Development, 6 April 2016. 
11  There are also several other national (e.g., Development Bank of Southern Africa, National 
Empowerment Fund) and provincial (KZN Growth Fund) DFIs in South Africa. 
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By virtue of their mandate, DFIs articulate both financial and “social return” 
(Chiapello 2015) well before II takes off, gaining practical experience and 
developing their own investment procedure. Consequently, they are today at 
the forefront of the II community both quantitatively, in terms of capital dis-
bursed, and qualitatively, promoting and standardizing II practices through 
national or global networks – for instance by DBSA’s participation at the Na-
tional task force or the International Finance Corporation in the GIIN. 
Second, non-DFIs investors collectively execute 307 deals representing $4.9 
billion between 2006 and 2015. Two groups of South African institutional 
investors are particularly active on this financial market for empowerment: 
insurance companies and pension funds. 
For instance, Old Mutual is a well-established and longstanding insurance 
company created in Cape Town in 1845. During the second part of the 20th 
century, the company became the most powerful financial conglomerate in the 
country, mainly through cross shareholdings with mining conglomerates and 
take-overs of industrial companies. In 1999, this conglomerate became a dual 
listed structure on both the London and Johannesburg stock exchanges. In spite 
of its globalization, the company remains anchored in South Africa through its 
subsidiaries, such as Nedbank, one of the country’s major commercial banks. 
At the end of the apartheid era, Old Mutual faced a wave of criticisms re-
garding, on one hand, its support to the National Party’s policies, and, on the 
other hand, its disinvestments from post-apartheid South Africa. Besides oth-
ers, South African academic Herman Marais denounces Old Mutual’s specula-
tive strategy and the weakness of its productive investments (Marais 2011). In 
order to face these controversies, Old Mutual, through one of its subsidiaries, 
developed a “socially sustainable” financial product range dedicated to “alter-
native assets.” It defines socially responsible investments as “[investments] that 
provide investors with both commercial returns and tangible social and devel-
opmental impact. In South Africa, the primary focus of SRI [socially responsi-
ble Investments] is the provision of basic services and infrastructure develop-
ment” (Old Mutual subsidiary 2013). It has launched five SRI funds so far: i) 
Infrastructure and development bond fund, to support infrastructure develop-
ment; ii) Development equity fund, to take equities into SMEs supporting job 
creation, affordable housing, access to services, and healthcare; iii) Community 
property fund, to fund mall construction in former homeland and township; iv) 
Power debt fund, to develop renewable energy especially solar panels and wind 
turbines; v) South African farm fund.  
Alongside insurance companies, pension funds, and more particularly public 
pension funds, are also very active on the II market in South Africa. The Gov-
ernment Employee Pension Fund (GEPF) is the largest pension fund in South 
Africa managing public servants’ retirements. This pension fund is managed by 
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a public entity, the Public Investment Corporation (PIC), supervised by the 
country’s National Treasury and accountable to Parliament.12 In 2016, PIC had 
R1.857 trillion assets under management, making it the largest African institu-
tional investor. Its portfolio is divided between 75% of listed South African 
assets (bonds, currencies), 10% of non-listed SA assets (equities, real estate), 
10% of offshore investments being in Africa or in Western countries, and 5% 
of “development investments” in South Africa (PIC 2016). A specific division 
into PIC, Isibaya Fund, manages “development investments” in particular 
offering a large range of financial products (loan, mezzanine, equities).  
Institutional investors either directly manage their II portfolio or they invest 
through dedicated third parties. In the last decade, several specialized asset 
managers set up and launched II funds. These include Praxis Active, a private 
equity fund launched in 1997, investing in private clinics, pharmacies, and 
opticians based in areas previously reserved for disadvantaged populations, 
either suburban townships or rural former homelands. Asset managers behind 
these new financial products are not outsiders to the South African financial 
sector as they are often linked to major banks or insurance companies – e.g., 
Ashburton Investments that partakes in the National Task Force for Impact 
Investing is part of the First Rand group,13 while Old Mutual holds 25% of 
Green Firm. Beyond asset management firms, a broad II supporting ecosystem 
exists in South Africa: a variety of incubators and accelerators (e.g. Awethu 
Project or Invotech), business consultants (e.g., Dalberg or Monitor Deloitte), 
academic research centers (e.g., the Bertha Centre for Social Innovation and 
Entrepreneurship at the University of Cape Town; GIIN 2016, 77). 
Focusing on actors, rather than new vectors of capital distribution, II off-
take in SA looks like a recycling and expansion of existing financial circuits 
and intermediaries. To underpin this observation, we will now analyze and 
historicize the sectorial allocation of impact investments. 
2.3  Toward New Avenues for Accumulation? 
The GIIN report details the distribution of II by sectors between 2006 and 
2015. For DFIs, three sectors largely dominate: “energy,” “extractives,” and 
“manufacturing”14; while non-DFIs focus mainly on “financial services” fol-
lowed by “manufacturing” and “energy.”15 It therefore clearly appears that IIs 
mostly occur in Mineral-Energy Complex’s sectors reinforcing the historical 
accumulation regime.  
 
12  Government employees’ pension law (1996) and PIC Act (2004). 
13  One of the big five in the SA banking sector. 
14  Together these sectors account for about $14 billion and 3730 deals (GIIN 2016, 68). 
15  The report identifies 28 deals in “financial services” ($1.6 billion), 47 deals in the two other 
sectors ($3 billion).  
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However, II also opens new accumulation avenues for investors. Firstly, 
through “financial services” but also through the development of social ser-
vices for the poorer and previously disadvantaged racial groups such as “hous-
ing,” “health,” “ICT,” or “education” as listed above. As written by Pons-
Vignon and Segatti (2013) in the post-apartheid area characterized by a neolib-
eral state, successive governments have promoted a social service marketiza-
tion, delegating them to a “third sector.” II investors and managers step into 
this breach in marginal urban (township) and rural (former homelands) areas 
where inequalities and social issues are concentrated: poverty rate, HIV preva-
lence, indebtedness. As such, they worked and continue to work for a financial 
inclusion (Mader 2018) through “banking the unbanked” programs. By broad-
ening the access to credit, impact investors claim to promote social mobility as 
they open up the consumer goods market and private ownership doors to the 
“bottom-of-the pyramid” (Prahalad 2006). However, as shown by Deborah 
James (2014), financial inclusion and often related commodification of services 
and assets (such as land) result in increased inequalities and potentially social 
conflicts as tragically illustrated by the Marikana killings in 2012.  
Secondly, several impact investors aimed at developing projects in the agri-
cultural sector: for instance, South Africa’s Public Investment Corporation 
(PIC) invested so far 3 billion Rand16 into agriculture and agribusiness SMEs 
and funds,17 such as Green Firm. In post-apartheid South Africa, the develop-
ment of rural areas is not only a major economic challenge, its socio-political 
importance relates to past racially-motivated homeland policies, the concentra-
tion of land property into white commercial farmers’ hands, and to the still dual 
character of the farming sector (Cochet 2015). From 1994 onwards, the succes-
sive ANC governments implemented land reform programs and supported 
“black emerging farmers.” But so far, the situation on the ground remains dire 
and unequal. Land reform only redistributed about 8% of the land, unemploy-
ment rates are between 35 and 50%, labour conditions on the farms are often 
poor with social movements developing as illustrated by the overall agricultural 
workers strike in the Western Cape province in 2013.  
Thirdly, through II, South African financial institutions develop their activi-
ties abroad in other African countries. This reflects an extension of the invest-
ment scope toward “frontier markets,” such as Swaziland for example. While 
 
16  Current exchange rate, approximately USD 1 = 13.5 South African Rands. 
17 “The fund will approach Agriculture investments through partnering with established com-
mercial farming enterprises. The main objective would be to enable these commercial farm-
ing entities through debt and equity to facilitate the development of previously under de-
veloped farmland with the objective of increasing productive capacity and contributing to 
food security while generating excellent investment returns for the GEPF. Agriculture and 
agro-processing are therefore attractive developmental investments because of their posi-
tive attributes in relation to social impact and returns.” Discours de John Oliphant, Principal 
Executive Officer du GEPF, au cercle de la presse du Cap, 23 April 2013. 
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the socio-economic context of that country has long been perceived as a risk 
and has discouraged investors, the II framework reversed these perceptions, 
making Swaziland appear as an opportunity. Green Firm for instance manages 
a fund, financed by the pension fund of civil servants, dedicated to agricultural 
development in Swaziland. Through this quick analysis of the distribution of II 
portfolios, we note two complementary trends: II financial circuits foster the 
MEC but also open new avenues for accumulation, especially through invest-
ments in social services.  
2.4  II as “Reparative” Instruments 
II in South Africa is largely embedded in historical institutions and local dy-
namics. Looking at both actors and targeted sectors, we highlight the historical 
continuity of financial circuits for empowerment and of institutions from 
volkskapitalism to contemporary Black Economic Empowerment. During this 
period, finance professionals set up their own procedures and instruments, 
which evolved over time. Initially, these actors (whether the DFIs or special-
ized asset managers, besides others) did not identify and recognize themselves 
as impact investors. The GIIN report’s authors note this paradox: 
The term “impact investing” is less commonly used or understood in South 
Africa than elsewhere in the region or elsewhere in Africa. Many investors in-
terviewed did not consider themselves to be impact investors, even when they 
had stated impact goals, explicitly tracked impact, and compensated their 
teams based on impact performance. In some instances, investors cited a lack 
of familiarity with the term. One investor mentioned that only after attending a 
conference on impact investing the previous year had she become aware of the 
concept. Others associated impact investing more closely with East African 
countries and did not consider it a trend in South Africa. Many interviewees 
mentioned a general discomfort in South Africa with mixing “charity and 
business,” expressing that mandated CSI under BBBEE had exhausted corpo-
rations’ and high-net-worth individuals’ capacity to support impact initiatives. 
(GIIN 2016, 62). 
In this quotation, South African investors stand out, compared to what happens 
in other, less developed African countries, as they distinguish II and BBBEE. 
On the contrary, II promoters (GIIN, Bertha institute) gather all these different 
investment practices under the same banner as impacts are 1) planned and 2) 
tracked. But rather than being a rigid device, II appears as being a flexible 
label. Like for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), the success of II “[…] 
lies, to a great extent, in its capacity to claim global applicability (under written 
by supposedly universal market value) and at the same time to frame those 
values in line with particular paradigms of national development” (Rajak 2011, 
19).  
Such a diversity creates difficulties when trying to set up a typology of II 
practices. Philipp Golka (2019) identified three II categories: investments into 
producing and service firms in Western capitalisms; investments into social and 
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public sectors in Western capitalisms; investments into basic services in the 
global South.  
The South African case highlights a fourth one, categorized by “reparative” 
or “corrective” investments in post-colonial environments. Corporates and their 
(mostly white) shareholders and managers assign a small portion of their bene-
fits to further integrate previously disadvantaged racial groups (i.e., Blacks, 
Colored, Indians, etc.) into the market economy and a private welfare system. 
Indeed, during apartheid these populations were intentionally kept away from 
economic growth and the redistributive system. As such, like for environment 
and biodiversity, “colonial redress” and “social reconciliation” (Somerville 
2018) become then channels of accumulation.18 
From a socio-historical perspective, II in South Africa differs from 1) II in 
western countries because of its explicit racial dimension; but also 2) II in most 
of the other African countries where international and western DFIs overcome 
the lack of welfare state. Consequently, it will be interesting to see how these 
local economic, social, and political contexts frame concrete financial practic-
es, procedures, and tools. 
3.  Impact Investment at Work: The South African 
Farmland Investment Fund 
Having discussed II’s roots in South Africa, the focus will now shift towards 
the effective II set ups and uses and their implications at ground level focusing 
on the Green Firm case study. 
3.1  Sustainability in Practice: Between Return on Investment and 
Social Programs 
Green Firm is a small South African asset management company specialized in 
agriculture and agribusinesses created in 2006 by two Dutch entrepreneurs. In 
2015, Green Firm managed two different funds focusing respectively on agro 
investments in South Africa and Swaziland. The South African farm fund was 
set up in 2010, registered in Mauritius, collecting around $37 million to invest 
in South African farmlands and agricultural companies. The fund exclusively 
targets fruit farms (citrus, table grapes) and aims to acquire majority positions; 
in 2015, it had already acquired four farms, totaling about 5900 hectares. Two 
main South African institutional investors finance this fund: i) Old Mutual, and 
ii) the South African Public Pension Fund (PIC). In addition, several smaller 
 
18  Melanie Somerville (2018) analyses similar situations in Canada, looking at partnerships 
between asset managers and first nation’s communities. 
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European individual investors put money into the fund through its Luxemburg 
subsidiary.  
A binding contract defines the investment policy of the fund, detailing both 
1) its financial strategy and targets, and 2) its environmental and social objec-
tives. First, in order to generate a value-addition for its investors, Green Firm 
rents the farms to a third party agricultural firm. This allows for a stable reve-
nue stream during the fund's lifespan (10-12 years). Green Firm targets 10%, 
plus inflation, as the Internal Rate of Return (IRR), including both the annual 
lease payment and the appreciation of the land. As explained by Green Firm’s 
managing partner:  
[The IRR] is actually very predictable. Because farmland traditionally rises 
with 2 to 6 % per year, according to real capital gain over time historically. 
You get a 8% yield on your lease which is inflation linked. So it is 8+4, you 
get 12%; take off the management fee and you get 10%.”19  
Second, fund managers also define the fund’s environmental and social policy. 
Green Firm adopted from the beginning an II approach and rather than separat-
ing financial and social returns, they established a clear relation between them, 
as stated in the 2013 annual report: 
Social returns are an integral component of the Fund’s performance. Im-
provements to worker healthcare, housing and sanitation, job creation and 
skills transfer ensure that the quality of the farmland is maintained. This con-
tributes to the long-term sustainability of the operations and economic em-
powerment of the surrounding communities. These factors add significant 
value to the farmland asset over time and are expected to result in positive re-
turns at the end of the Fund term. (Green Firm 2013, 13) 
From this quotation, it clearly appears that Green Firm aims to contribute pri-
marily to South African economic (job creation, skills transfer) and social 
(housing and sanitation) rural development. In addition, Green Firm often 
stresses another social objective regarding land transfer in a post-apartheid 
environment. Indeed, as both Old Mutual and PIC, i.e., Green Firm’s major 
shareholders, are BEE certified with a significant proportion of black share-
holders (urban public servants or BEE trusts), Green Firm claims that acquiring 
farms owned by white farmers is a contribution to land redistribution in South 
Africa benefitting the country’s previously disadvantaged populations. 
Based on the social objectives related to broad investment policies, such as 
rural development, Green firm identifies several specific related impacts. First-
ly, the creation of jobs is the main targeted impact. The objective is to promote 
the inclusion and empowerment of black rural communities through the labor 
market. With a focus on employment, Green Firm is promoting an employee-
 
19  Interview with Green Firm director, Cape Town, 16 March 2015. To calculate the historical 
appreciation of farmland by year, Green Firm endeavours to analyse the agricultural land 
deals in South Africa during the last 20 years. 
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based farming model, in opposition to an entrepreneurial, family-based farming 
model which was and still is the dominant farming model in South Africa (An-
seeuw, Ducastel, and Boche 2015). Secondly, the firm wants to reinforce em-
ployees’ access to two specific social services: health and education. This 
choice echoes other social responsibility programs set up by major South Afri-
can conglomerates, outside of the financial industry, such as implemented by 
the mining company Anglo-American (Rajak 2011). Concretely, their in-
volvement as an impact investor takes two complementary forms: 1) the defini-
tion and implementation of particular programs in order to increase social 
impacts on their farms; 2) the development of specific impact evaluation pro-
cedures.  
First, in order to reach these social impacts, particularly job creation, Green 
Firm aims to increase the farm production and productivity. In addition, the 
firm allocates 0.5% of each investment to social and environmental expendi-
tures on their farms. Three projects, mobilizing external consultants,20 have 
been defined and implemented so far: 1) an empowerment project –  
Depending on the skills development level of the workers, an Adult Education 
and Training (AET) program is rolled out on all farms, covering literacy, nu-
meracy and communication. Additional training such as personal financial 
planning and life skills is also offered […] with the aim of empowering work-
ers and creating independent emerging farmers [(…].”; 2) a healthcare project 
– “Where possible, the Fund establishes access to primary healthcare services 
for permanent farm workers. This offers workers unlimited access doctors, 
dentists and optometrists, free provision of acute and chronic medicines, and 
radiology and pathology services according to a prescribed protocol […].”; 
and 3) a housing project – “The aim of the Fund’s operators is to provide 
housing and facilities that are better than the norm. This not only benefits the 
permanent workers in terms of human dignity, but also enables the farm to at-
tract quality seasonal workers. (Green firm 2016, 12-17) 
Second, Green Firm develops its own impact assessment matrix, which is in-
cluded in every quarterly or annual report addressed to the investors in order to 
track the evolution of the selected impacts on every single farm. 
  
 
20  While at the Green Firm, a full time dedicated employee is in charge of the impact programs 
and evaluations.  
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Table 1:  The Green Firm Matrix  
 Farm 1 Farm 2 Farm 3 Farm 4 Total 
Permanent employees 
(workers with contracts 
longer than 1 year) 
At take-on: 25 94 102 83 304 
At December 
2015: 57 71 124 86 338 
Seasonal workers,  
depending on season 
Currently, up 
to: 450 950 520 440 2360 
Projected new jobs 
(permanent and season-
al), due to expansion 
Projected new 
jobs: 300 465 100 212 1077 
Employees with access 
to pre-paid primary 
healthcare 
At take-on: 0 0 0 0 0 
At December 
2015: 61 0 80 98 239 
Employees with access 
to HIV/AIDS services 
At take-on: 0 0 0 0 0 
At December 
2015: 61 71 80 98 310 
Employees receiving 
adult education 
At take-on: 0 0 0 0 0 
At December 
2015: 32 27 15 8 82 
Employees receiving 
management training 
At take-on: 0 0 0 0 0 
At December 
2015: 4 19 3 3 29 
Source: Green Firm 2015. 
 
For every impact tracked, we note a gain between the situation “at take-on” and 
the last counting in December 2015. This matrix distinguishes two categories 
of workers: a large group of “seasonal workers” mostly hired during the harvest 
season, which remain totally out of these social services; and a smaller group of 
“permanent workers;” with contracts of one year or longer. It is worth noting 
that while a majority of the permanent workers gets better access to healthcare 
and HIV services, only few of them participate in the educational programs or 
management training sessions.  
The asset manager has an important say in defining the paths and tools for 
impact. Indeed, it is part of his duties, and the fund’s investors implicitly rec-
ognize his capacity to produce impacts in these particular matters (Golka 
2019). Asset managers select targeted impacts according to their capacity to 
trigger a positive dynamic with limited resources and time, i.e., the fund 
lifespan. Hence, the Green firm matrix focuses on very specific elements, leav-
ing out many – often more transformative – aspects. For instance, nothing is 
said about the status of employees, the gender relations, their level of remuner-
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ation, and the work conditions or the impact on neighboring small-scale or 
family farmers.  
What appears clearly through the Green firm’s impact strategy review is a 
depoliticized approach to rural and agricultural development. Analyzing a rural 
development project in Lesotho, James Ferguson shows how the “development 
apparatus,” i.e., NGOs, and state bureaucracies tend to depoliticize develop-
ment issues “by uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, 
and by promising technical solutions to the sufferings of powerless and op-
pressed people” (Ferguson 1990, 256). Following the pioneering work of Fer-
guson and studying AIDS control in Africa, Moritz Hunsmann defines depolit-
icization as as an “artificial deconflictualization” of inequalities and balance of 
power (Hunsmann 2016). Such a depoliticization relies on a particular cogni-
tive framework stressing on individual responsibilities and the decision making 
process’s containment into technocratic spheres.  
Turning back to our case study, Green firm adopts a top-down approach de-
fining and implementing its impact strategy according to its own interests and 
objectives without any consultation or participation of the beneficiaries. In 
addition, by promoting empowerment programs and individual health insur-
ance product they clearly link poverty and individual behavior. As such they 
neglect public policies’ influence regarding land transfer for instance making 
poverty a private issue. Even if the financial bureaucracy (i.e., investment 
manager, independent consultants) replaces the “humanitarian technocracy” 
(Hunsmann 2016), poverty and inequality conceptions remain the same. 
3.2  II as a Distant Control Device 
If II metrics are commercial tools for engaging with investors, they are also a 
control device for both investors and asset managers. Indeed, investors, manag-
ers, and farms are often geographically scattered, as they are located in differ-
ent cities and even countries. For instance, Green Firm centralizes the man-
agement of four different farms located in four different South African 
provinces, while its investors are in South Africa’s major cities (Cape Town 
and Pretoria), as well as in Europe. In order to allow exchanges and maintain 
confidence between those separated parties, several legal devices exist (e.g., 
reporting procedures, contracts, etc.). The mobilization of II is part of this 
specific architecture. 
Indeed, the adoption of such a framework implies strict reporting procedures 
from the farm to the asset managers and from the asset managers to the inves-
tors. For instance, Green Firm prepares an annual “Impact Report” for its in-
vestors. Through narratives about living conditions on farms, descriptions of 
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the weather, and through photography and/or satellite imagery, these reports 
materialize the investments and show the investors their assets.21 
II’s procedures, such as the matrix above, increase the transparency and the 
control, all along the investment chain. Such controls are not only based on the 
firms’ balance sheets, they are also related to environmental and social metrics. 
Consequently, through this normalization process every single dimension of 
farm work is reduced to something quantifiable (Ducastel and Anseeuw 2018).  
Green Firm, like other asset management companies, generally hires exter-
nal consultants, either for the social and environmental farm valuation, for the 
definition of their impact programs, or for the preparation of their impact re-
port. The intervention of external and independent professionals is a way to 
guarantee the veracity of the information that circulates between the actors and, 
as such, to increase the confidence and the control from one to another. In 
addition, such external controls tend to frame a priori the actors’ practices in a 
manner consistent with II framework (Power 2005).  
The implementation of social and environmental impact programs can also 
increase the head office’s control over the farm, and especially over the farm 
workers. Green Firm selects the potential beneficiaries for the healthcare pro-
gram according to their experience on the farm, their seniority, their engage-
ment and performance, and also according to their relationship with the man-
agement. They refuse to fund healthcare programs for workers with less than 
two years in the farm or who participated in the 2013 strike; in 2015, only 239 
of 338 permanent workers benefited from an access to the healthcare program. 
Therefore, Green firm implements a management policy of individualizing 
remuneration on their farms.  
Another example concerns the construction and the modernization of work-
ers’ accommodation. The farm workers live mainly on former “reserves,”22 
often far from the farm. Green Firm builds and furnishes houses for free to a 
certain number of their workers, giving them the opportunity to attract and 
keep good workers in the region, on one hand, and to assert higher control over 
workers’ extra-professional activities, on the other hand. As noted by Dinah 
Rajak, the same consequences arise from the healthcare program: “through the 
new technologies of HIV management, old boundaries demarcating the compa-
ny’s zone of responsibility are re-inscribed, erecting a meta-physical ‘cordon 
sanitaire’ between the workplace and, what is described in official corporate 
discourses as, the ‘world beyond our perimeter fence’ ” (Rajak 2011, 143). As 
with Corporate Social Responsibility for instance, II programs are also human 
resource tools, mobilized by Green Firm to discipline workers from a distance. 
 
21  Extract from Green Firm Impact Report, 2014.  
22  Pursuant to the Land Act, adopted in 1913, South African governments concentrated “Afri-
can” native populations on “reserves,” later called “Bantustans,” representing 13% of the 
national territory.  
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Indeed, beyond material leverages (i.e., health insurances, houses), economic 
and entrepreneurial empowerment programs set up by the Green firm reinforce 
their grip over farm workers by disseminating market discipline’s principles. 
By promoting personal financial training and education, they aim to make their 
workers auto-entrepreneurs employing themselves. The objective is to train 
workers to profit from their comparative advantages on markets which might 
allow them to take advantage from these capacities. As stated by Dinah Rajak 
(2011), Green firm diffuses a neoliberal conception among black communities 
where “market discipline” becomes “the source of social mobility.”23  
Finally, II is also a risk management instrument, implemented against poten-
tial social mobilizations and conflicts. Indeed, investors and financial workers 
are being targeted more and more by advocacy coalitions, unionists, or activist 
networks for their responsibilities in the economic crisis or the increase of 
social inequalities.24 II appears as an answer by the financial community 
against these critics and represents a “pro-active management of social con-
flictuality” (Homel 2006). Thanks to this standardized framework, the financial 
industry claims its legitimacy to define what development strategy to imple-
ment, without any consultation with other parties. It enables Green Firm to 
redefine its authority over farm employees by mobilizing II engineering; there-
fore, these instruments reinforce the borders of the company/fund’s enclaves 
(Ferguson 2005) through particular moral and social orders.  
However, the concrete implementation on the ground of such a framework 
is not a linear process with Green Firm’s initiatives regularly face tensions and 
difficulties. For instance, the literacy programs developed by Green Firm were 
abandoned after two years. They were not well attended by workers who per-
ceived them as being an additional constraint and monitoring tool, rather than 
as being an opportunity. Also, Green Firm faced resistance from farm manag-
ers who either refused to engage in these social and environmental programs, 
or “instrumentalized” them for their own benefit. Green Firm’s partners dis-
covered that several farm managers selected beneficiaries for literacy and 
healthcare programs according to their own networks and relationships. These 
examples make it clear that such projects of II are defined from and by the top, 
according to Green Firm’s investors’ requirements, rather than from the 
ground, according to workers’ and farmers’ issues and strategies. A question 
remains: why, if II only increases managers’ control over workers and assets, 
do investors concerned with social and environmental issues still support and 
 
23  Melanie Somerville (2018), in Canada, analyzes similar attempts from asset managers to 
“financialize natives,” reproducing “racial essentialisms.” 
24  For instance, development finance institutions’ investments are scrutinized by European 
NGO coalitions. See GRAIN et RIAO-RDC, 2015. Agro-colonialism in the Congo. European 
and US development finance is bankrolling a new round of colonialism. OXFAM, Risky busi-
ness. Intermediary lending and development finance, 2012. 
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promote II funds? Firstly, because investors are far from the assets. Indeed, 
aside from exceptional visits25, the supervision over Green firm’s farms is 
limited to quarterly and annual reports prepared by the asset manager. Second-
ly, South African investors and asset managers share the same conceptions and 
representations regarding agriculture and farm management inherited from the 
country's agrarian history. During apartheid, the control over farm workers’ 
activities and movements in and outside the farm (through “the pass” system) 
gave the farmers extra power within the farm's perimeter and beyond. Today, a 
paternalist model remains largely in place; Green firm and their investors are 
not trying to dismantle it but rather to improve farm workers' trade-offs. 
5. Conclusion 
The first section historicizes and maps II circuits in South Africa: from 
volkskapitalism to Black Economic Empowerment’s (BEE) corporate social 
investments, we highlight the country’s long-term history of empowerment or 
reparative finance with its specific actors and financial circuits. Based on the 
Green firm case study, we assess a particular II circuit in practice in the South 
African post-apartheid context. Rather than a transformation of the South Afri-
can accumulation regime and its dominant players, II legitimates and reinforces 
the status quo. On the cognitive side, II relies on and promotes a depoliticitized 
approach of poverty and inequality exempting South African (financial) con-
glomerates from their responsibilities. In this framework, they appear as a 
solution to rural underdevelopment while largely benefiting from expropriation 
public policies in the past and today. On the instrument side, II gives investors 
and financiers increased resources to manage the social and environmental 
risks, to control human resources and farm workers, and to valorise their rural 
and agricultural assets. During the apartheid era, white commercial farmers 
benefit from land and agricultural policies – e.g., the “pass system” restricting 
black workers free circulation, to exercise a strict control over farm labor and 
natural resources. Within the II framework, farms are still managed as enclaves 
but as asset enclaves under financiers’ supervision. 
The South African State plays an active role in promoting and framing such 
a depoliticized approach. While in the UK (Golka 2019) or the US (Barman 
2016), II development can be analyzed in terms of the reduction – or coloniza-
tion – of a welfare state’s perimeter, in South Africa we rather analyze it as a 
state redeployment. Indeed, public financial institutions (DBSA, PIC, IDC) are 
the main II investors and promoters. In the context of the incapacity and in-
 
25  In August 2013, Green Firm organized a visit on its farm in Limpopo for potential new 
investors and a business reporter. After visiting the orange trees and the plant, the tour fin-
ished with workers’ restored houses.  
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creasing indebtedness of the South African State (Meyiwa et al. 2014), these 
public financial institutions seem to play an increasing role in (social) public 
policies and investments thanks to their ability to optimize public money and to 
set up off-balance sheet policies (Mertens and Thiemann 2019). Through their 
financial lens, these institutions promote the “attractiveness paradigm,” i.e., 
development policies focus on (private) investors’ attraction to fund innova-
tions and to create jobs (Feher 2018). Consequently, they frame and support 
“new asset classes” particularly in social services and development sectors as a 
distant government technique. 
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